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Abstract 
The effect of changes in age structure on economic growth has been widely studied in 
the demography and population economics literature. The beneficial effect of changes in 
age structure after a decrease in fertility has become known as the demographic 
dividend. In this paper we reassess the empirical evidence on the associations among 
economic growth, changes in age structure, labor force participation and educational 
attainment. Using a global panel of countries, we find that once the effect of human 
capital dynamics is controlled for there is no evidence that changes in age structure 
affect labor productivity. Our results imply that improvements in educational attainment 
are the key to explaining productivity and income growth and that a substantial portion 
of the demographic dividend is an education dividend. 
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Age Structure, Education and Economic Growth 
Jesús Crespo Cuaresma, Wolfgang Lutz and Warren Sanderson 
1 Introduction 
The introduction of the concept of the demographic dividend was an important step 
forward in untying the Gordian knot of the relationship between demographic change 
and economic growth. That relationship had been hotly contested for decades (Ehrlich 
1968; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990; Simon 1982, 1981) and in the end, no strong scientific 
consensus had emerged from the debate (National Research Council 1986). These early 
contributions focused primarily on changes in total population size and did not address 
changes in the composition of the population according to various potentially relevant 
characteristics of people.   
Bloom and Williamson (1998) focused on the relationship between age structure 
change and economic growth and thus explicitly introduced age as a relevant source of 
population heterogeneity into the analysis. Other potentially relevant sources of 
population heterogeneity which play an important role as a potential catalyst of the 
demographic dividend are labor force participation and the level of educational 
attainment. While Bloom and Williamson and several other key papers on this issue did 
include education in their specifications, the now widely used and popularized concept 
of the demographic dividend only refers to changes in age-dependency ratios (based on 
fixed intervals of chronological age) whose evolution over the course of demographic 
transition presumably results in a demographic window that first opens and then closes 
in a predictable way as the old-age dependency ratio starts to increase (UNFPA 2011). 
In contrast to this dominant focus on changing age distributions recent studies of the 
effect of changes in age-specific educational attainment showed that indeed 
improvements in education seem to be a key driver of economic growth (see Lutz et al. 
2008) and have predictive power for future income developments (see Crespo Cuaresma 
and Mishra 2011). In this paper, we step back to take a fresh look at the question of how 
the effect of improving education relates to that of changing age structure or, in other 
words, to what extent the demographic dividend is really an education dividend. 
Improving education can impact economic growth through various channels. 
Higher skill levels of the labor force can directly translate into higher productivity and 
into better and faster take up of new technologies. In addition, it has been shown that 
education is an important factor for improving the health status of the population and 
also tends to contribute to the quality of governance more generally (KC and Lentzer 
2010; Lutz et al. 2010; Pamuk et al. 2011). Importantly, female education is one of the 
key factors – if not the single most important factor – in inducing fertility decline and 
hence driving the declining young-age dependency ratio, which is the key factor in the 
demographic dividend argument. There is a vast body of literature documenting and 
analyzing this pervasive effect of female education on fertility, particularly for societies 
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still in the process of demographic transition (for example Bongaarts 2010; Cochrane 
1979; Cochrane et al. 1990; Skirbekk and KC 2012). Lutz and KC (2011) illustrate the 
major effect of female education on population dynamics by showing that when 
assuming identical trajectories of education-specific fertility rates, different scenarios on 
future school enrolment trends can lead to a difference of more than one billion in the 
projected world population size already by 2050. In this sense, education can be seen as 
the key trigger of the fertility decline that in consequence kick-starts the demographic 
dividend. The timing of this effect is such that for a declining proportion of 0-20 year 
olds – assuming a 30 year average generation length – it is the education of 30-50 year 
old women that matters. These timing issues are important when it comes to the 
interpretation of modeling results. 
In this paper, we build on the prior literature by making an explicit distinction 
between the “productivity” effect and the “translations” effect, by articulating the two 
avenues through which human capital acquisition operates and measuring their separate 
contributions to economic growth, and by taking changes in labor force participation 
rates and changes in investment into account. For consistency, our empirical strategy 
here is to use the same conditional convergence model used in most other studies of the 
demographic dividend and to use the same sort of aggregated human capital variable as 
in previous studies. Our results indicate that once the (robust) growth effects of 
educational improvements are conditioned away, the demographic dividend is reduced 
exclusively to a quantitatively small translation effect. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review some of the 
key contributions to the literature dealing with the demographic dividend, with a 
specific view of the treatment of education in those models. In Section 3 we revisit the 
empirics of these associations using improved data as compared to previous studies. In 
the concluding section we discuss the results and suggest further lines of investigation 
for the future.  
2 Demographic Dividend Models 
We can date the modern literature on the demographic dividend as beginning with 
Bloom and Williamson (1998), who originally called the phase in which age structure 
change resulted in more rapid economic growth the “demographic gift”. The explosion 
of interest that followed was the result of five factors. First, Bloom and Williamson 
showed that age structure change accounted for around one-third of the East Asian 
economic miracle and was thus quantitatively large. Second, the econometric approach 
that they used was the standard conditional convergence framework used in many prior 
studies of economic growth. This approach was well understood and widely accepted 
and subsequently has been used in most studies of the demographic dividend. Third, the 
demographic dividend analysis provided a framework in which prior empirical studies 
of the determinants of economic growth could be consistently integrated. Fourth, the 
approach lent itself to an interesting comparison of the economic futures of South East 
Asian and South Asian economics, and finally because many people had strong a priori 
beliefs that demography and economic growth had to be strongly connected, a belief 
which up to the Bloom and Williamson papers did not have a convincing empirical 
justification.         
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Education and the demographic dividend were linked from the beginning. 
Bloom and Williamson (1998) studied the rate of real GDP per capita growth in 78 
countries between 1965 and 1990. One of the independent variables that they used was 
the level of human capital in 1965, measured as the log of the average years of post-
primary schooling of the population 25+ years old, based on data in Barro and Lee 
(1993). The results for the education variable were only reported for their OLS 
regressions and not the instrumental variable ones. In all those regressions the education 
variable always had a positive and statistically significant coefficient. The importance of 
education changes to the East Asian economic miracle, however, was not discussed in 
depth in Bloom and Williamson (1998).   
Kelley and Schmidt (2005) developed the demographic dividend model by 
making a distinction between the demographic determinants of the growth of output per 
person of working age, which they label the “productivity” effect, and the growth of 
output per capita due to changes in the share of the working age population in the total 
population, which they call the “translations” effect. They studied per capita economic 
growth in 86 countries over 4 time periods, 1960-1970, 1970-1980, 1980-1990, and 
1990-1995 and found that demographic changes worldwide accounted for around 20 
percent of economic growth, with a greater impact seen in Asia and Europe. The human 
capital variable was the log of the average years of post-primary schooling for males 
25+ years old and functioned as part of the productivity effect. In all their regressions, 
the coefficient of the education variable was statistically insignificant.    
The productivity effect has been studied in detail in more recent contributions. 
Bloom et al. (2009) show, in a panel of countries, that a reduction in fertility increases 
female labor force participation and thus increases the proportion of the working age 
population who are in the labor force. Lee et al. (2000, 2003) have introduced the 
concept of the second demographic dividend, which occurs when an aging population 
accumulates more wealth and that additional wealth is productively invested in the 
economy. Lutz et al. (2008) extend the demographic dividend model in two ways. First, 
they distinguish two mechanisms for human capital to influence economic growth, 
through the direct effect of the productivity of workers and indirectly through its effect 
on the rate of total factor productivity growth. Second, they use the new IIASA-VID 
education database (Lutz et al. 2007) to disaggregate education effects by both age and 
level of educational attainment. These data are more consistent and more detailed than 
previously existing data sources. Educational attainment distributions for four 
educational categories have been reconstructed by 5-year age groups and sex using 
methods of multi-dimensional population dynamics which also incorporate educational 
mortality differentials. Using data for 101 countries over six five-year time periods from 
1970-2000, they find that the direct productivity effect is particularly strong for older 
workers with secondary education while younger workers with tertiary education have 
the greatest effect on the speed of total factor productivity growth. 
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3 Revisiting the Empirics of Age Structure, Education and 
Income  
3.1 The Modeling Set-Up 
We adopt a modeling framework which is in the spirit of the literature on demographic 
dividend effects, but differs significantly in the details. The approach used for the 
statistical evaluation of the effect of demographic dynamics on economic growth is 
based on simple decompositions of output per capita into output per worker and a 
variable which captures changes in age structure and labor force participation.   
We start our analysis by considering an aggregate production function given by ��� = ����������1−�,          (1) 
where ��� is total output in country i at time t, ��� is total factor productivity, ��� is the 
capital stock and ��� is total labor input. Considering variables per worker, the 
production function given by (1) can be written as ��� = ������� ,           (2) 
where ��� = ���/��� is GDP per worker and ��� = ���/��� is capital per worker. In 
growth rates, equation (2) can be written as ∆ ln��� = ∆ ln��� + �∆ ln���.         (3) 
Since income per capita instead of income per worker is usually used for growth 
regressions, the relationship between total population, working age population and labor 
force needs to be taken into account in order to differentiate pure accounting effects 
from causal links between employment, age structure and income growth. Notice that  ��� = ������ = ������ ������ = ���� ������ ,         (4) 
where ���� denotes GDP per capita and ��� refers to total population. Combining (3) and 
(4) to obtain an expression for income per capita, ∆ ln���� = ∆ ln ��� + ∆ ln��� − ∆ ln��� = ∆ ln��� + �∆ ln��� + ∆ ln ��� − ∆ ln���  (5) 
Assuming that TFP growth is constant over time, the empirical implementation 
of (5) implies regressing the growth rate of income per capita on the growth rate of 
capital per worker, the growth rate of the labor force and the growth rate of population. 
The parameters associated with the last two variables should equal 1 and -1, 
respectively, if changes in the labor force share do not have productivity effects and 
only affect income per capita through the accounting channel exposed in (4).  
If we assume that, due to technology adoption and income convergence 
dynamics, the growth rate of TFP depends on the distance to the global technology 
frontier as proxied by the level of GDP per worker of the country, this specification can 
be rewritten as  ∆ ln���� = � + � ln���−1 + �∆ ln��� + ∆ ln��� − ∆ ln��� .     (6) 
Using the fact that  
ln��� = ln  ���� + ln �������� + ln ������� � = ln  ���� − ln �������� − ln � �������, 
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where ��� denotes working age population, ∆ ln���� = � + � ln����−1 − � ln ����−1���−1� − � ln � ���−1���−1� + �∆ ln��� + ∆ ln ��� − ∆ ln��� .      (7) 
This specification implies that the working age share and the participation rate 
should be added to the economic growth specification in addition to the growth rate of 
the labor force and total population. Parameter estimates of the same size and opposite 
sign of that of the initial income level for these two variables imply that changes in the 
participation rate and the working age share affect economic growth exclusively 
through the accounting channel described above.    
The production function given by (1) does not consider human capital as either 
an input of production or a determinant of TFP growth. We can easily generalize the 
production function to include human capital (see for example Benhabib and Spiegel 
1994; Hall and Jones 1999),   ��� = ����������1−�, 
where ��� = ℎ�����, and human capital per worker is denoted by ℎ�� , which in turn is 
defined as ℎ�� = exp����, 
where � refers to the returns to schooling and ��� are the average years of schooling of 
the labor force. The corresponding specification for the model with human capital is 
given by  ∆ ln���� = ∆ ln��� + �∆ ln��� + ∆ ln ��� − ∆ ln��� + (1 − �)�∆ ���.        (8) 
Assuming the dependence of technology growth on the distance to the 
technology frontier, the specification is then given by ∆ ln���� = � + � ln���� − � ln ����−1���−1� − � ln � ���−1���−1� + �∆ ln ��� + ∆ ln��� − ∆ ln��� + (1 − �)�∆ ���,  (9) 
In addition, the overall human capital stock (average years of schooling) is often 
assumed to affect the growth rate of TFP by acting as a catalyst of technology creation 
and technology adoption (see for instance Benhabib and Spiegel 1994, 2005).   ∆ ln���� = � + ���� + � ln���� − � ln ����−1���−1� − � ln � ���−1���−1� + �∆ ln��� + ∆ ln ��� − ∆ ln��� +(1 −�)�∆ ���,  (10) 
3.2 The Empirical Evidence 
We confront the different specifications above with a panel data for 105 countries over 
the period 1980-2005, divided into periods of five years. The selection of countries was 
exclusively determined by the availability of the required data. The source of our data 
and the list of countries included in the analysis are presented in the appendix. All the 
specifications estimated include country and period fixed effects. The inclusion of the 
lagged income per capita term on the right hand side of some of the models presented 
implies that the estimation of panel data models with country fixed effects, so as to 
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obtain inference from within-country dynamics, is not straightforward. Standard OLS 
estimation methods would lead to biased estimates since we do not take into account the 
correlation between the error term (which includes a country-specific fixed effect) and 
the lagged dependent variable. Generalized method of moments (GMM) methods have 
been proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1999) to overcome the endogeneity problem by using lagged values of first 
differenced and levels of the explained variable as instruments. In our empirical 
implementation we use the Blundell-Bond “system” GMM estimator (Blundell and 
Bond, 1999) for models which include lagged income per capita as an explanatory 
variable. The Blundell-Bond method has been shown to perform best for highly 
persistent variables, as is the case of income per capita.   
The estimation of the different specifications is presented in Table 1. For the 
models estimated by GMM (those which include the initial income per capita level as a 
regressor) we include the usual specification tests related to instrumentation (Sargan test 
for overidentifying restrictions) and to the characteristics of the residuals (the standard 
tests for first and second order residual autocorrelation). We account for the potential 
endogeneity of the growth rate in the labor force and the change in years of schooling 
using two lags of the variables and their first difference, as is done for the lagged 
income level in the framework of the Blundell and Bond (1999) method. As 
theoretically expected, the growth rate of the labor force is significantly and positively 
related to economic growth, with estimates that range between 0.8 and 2. The growth 
rate of population, on the other hand, does not enter the model significantly in any of the 
specifications, although its effect is on average positive. The fourth specification 
presented in Table 1, which includes the growth rates of the labor force and total 
population together with the participation rate and the working age share, as well as the 
change in years of schooling, shows demographic dividend effects which are above the 
pure translation effects defined by (4). The estimation results of this model would lead 
us to conclude that the participation and age structure effects which follow fertility 
declines have direct productivity and economic growth enhancing effects. Furthermore, 
the effect of education would be deemed to be statistically insignificant and human 
capital investments would not appear to have a clear return in terms of income growth.  
In the fifth column of Table 1 we consider education to affect economic growth 
not only as an input of the production function through the augmentation of labor 
income but also as a determinant of total factor productivity in the sense of Nelson and 
Phelps (1966). The variable measuring average years of schooling has a significant 
positive effect on economic growth and its inclusion as an extra regressor renders the 
parameter attached to the change in educational attainment also positive and significant. 
Furthermore, the returns to education implied by the parameter estimate associated with ∆��� are approximately 18%, well above those usually found in the microeconometric 
literature. Theoretically, this is precisely what would be expected from returns to 
education at the macroeconomic level, where externalities are likely to be quantitatively 
much larger than at the individual level.  
Most importantly, the pure demographic effects (excluding education) implied 
by the parameters attached to the labor participation and working age share variables are 
now not significantly different from the pure translation effects resulting from the fact 
that theoretically the models are built on output per worker but empirically it is income 
per capita which is used. Column (6) in Table 1 estimates the restricted model, imposing 
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the parameter restrictions implied by the existence of translation effects. Such a 
regression implies that the estimated effects of the human and physical capital variables 
are to be interpreted as direct effects on income per worker. The size of the effect of 
human capital improvements in this specification appears accordingly much larger than 
in the rest of the regressions. 
The relative role of age-structure and labor-force participation versus human 
capital dynamics, assuming that the translation effect is in place, can be evaluated by 
assessing the quantitative effect of typical variations in the corresponding variables. 
Obtaining the within-country standard deviation of the ratio of the labor force to total 
population and its growth rate, as well as of mean years of schooling and its change, we 
can calculate the size of the effect of typical in-sample variations of our variables of 
interest on income growth. In Table 2 we present the resulting effects of a change by 
one (within-country) standard deviation of these variables on yearly income per capita 
growth implied by model (6) in Table 1. The results are presented evaluating the 
variation of the age-structure/participation and human capital variables in the full 
sample as well as in subsamples defined by income groups according to the World 
Bank. As compared to the human capital effects, the size of the translation effects is 
relatively small in the full sample. In particular, the relative size of the realized human 
capital effects in low income countries, which present only limited growth effects due to 
the accounting channel, is particularly large. The group of lower middle income 
countries appears to have benefitted of both relatively large translation and even larger 
human capital effects on economic growth in comparison to the rest of the sample, with 
the exception of the small and heterogeneous group of non-OECD high income 
countries (formed by Equatorial Guinea, The Bahamas and Singapore).  
Summarizing the set of results presented above, we can conclude that not 
accounting for the role of education as a determinant of economic growth properly 
would have led us to believe that the beneficial income growth effects took place 
directly through changes in age structure. Once we control for both the stock and 
improvement in human capital we find that, statistically, it is the change in educational 
attainment levels that are the primal source of the demographic dividend effects that are 
present in the data. Empirically, the pure effect of changes in age structure on economic 
growth appears to take place exclusively through translation effects related to the 
measurement of income as GDP per capita instead of GDP per worker. Given the fact 
that our preferred specifications control for both educational attainment and labor force 
dynamics, the estimated effects of human capital go beyond the role that the variable 
plays as a determinant of labor force participation. It is the increased productivity and 
technology innovation or adoption capabilities of more educated individuals in the labor 
force that appear particularly relevant as an explanatory factor of growth differences in 
GDP per worker within countries for our sample.  
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Table 1: Panel estimates, economic growth models 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) ∆ ln��� 0.419** 0.582*** 0.589*** 0.564*** 0.559*** 0.492*** 
 
[0.160] [0.165] [0.126] [0.133] [0.102] [0.111] ∆ ln ��� - 0.797** 1.479** 1.961*** 1.609*** 1 
  
[0.376] [0.658] [0.485] [0.510] (imposed) ∆ ln��� - 0.89 0.37 0.187 0.348 -1 
  
[0.997] [1.052] [1.081] [0.979] (imposed) 
ln���� - - -0.043 -0.064 -0.110** -0.178** 
   
[0.0479] [0.0437] [0.0479] [0.085] 
ln �������� - - 0.302 0.557** 0.519* 0.178** 
   
[0.326] [0.271] [0.288] [0.085] 
ln ������� � - - 0.871 1.391** 0.995 0.178** 
   
[0.790] [0.623] [0.619] [0.085] ∆��� - - - 0.131 0.400** 0.717** 
   
 [0.170] [0.177] [0.306] ���  - - - - 0.0405*** 0.0671** 
   
 
 
[0.0128] [0.0335] 
Test for accounting effect: 
growth rates (p-val.) 
- 0.1538 0.3767 0.0503 0.1350 - 
Test for accounting effect: 
Levels (p-val.) 
- - 0.5035 0.0201 0.1941 
- 
Test for accounting effect: 
growth rates and levels (p-val.) 
- - 0.7144 0.0505 0.3918 
- 
Sargan test (p-val.) - - 0.1323 0.2457 0.5433 0.2665 
AR(1) test (p-val.) - - 0.0032 0.0017 0.0026 0.0522 
AR(2) test (p-val.) - - 0.1768 0.2548 0.2918 0.1741 
Observations 521 521 521 521 521 521 
Number of countries 105 105 105 105 105 105 
Robust standard errors in brackets. *(**)[***] stands for significance at the 10%(5%)[1%] level. Tests for 
accounting effects refer to the tests of the restrictions described in the text. “Sargan test” is the p-value of 
the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, “AR(p) test” is the p-value of the test for p-th order 
autocorrelation of the residuals. All specifications include country and period fixed effects. Variables 
which are in growth rates or changes are measured over the corresponding period. All other variables are 
measured at the first year of the period. 
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Table 2: Size of effects on economic growth 
  Within-country  
standard deviation 
Effect on yearly 
income growth 
Full sample (∆ ln ��� − ∆ ln���) 2.93% 0.59% 
 ln(��� /���) 4.98% 0.18% 
 ∆��� 0.081 1.17% 
 ���  0.689 0.92% 
High income countries: OECD (N=23) (∆ ln ��� − ∆ ln���) 2.86% 0.57% 
 ln(��� /���) 4.31% 0.15% 
 ∆��� 0.065 0.93% 
 ���  0.56 0.75% 
High income countries: non OECD (N=3) (∆ ln ��� − ∆ ln���) 6.56% 1.31% 
 ln(��� /���) 6.85% 0.24% 
 ∆��� 0.131 1.88% 
 ���  0.855 1.15% 
Low income countries (N=30) (∆ ln ��� − ∆ ln���) 2.10% 0.42% 
 ln(��� /���) 2.78% 0.10% 
 ∆��� 0.091 1.31% 
 ���  0.685 0.92% 
Lower middle income countries (N=32) (∆ ln ��� − ∆ ln���) 3.33% 0.67% 
 ln(��� /���) 5.05% 0.18% 
 ∆��� 0.088 1.26% 
 ���  0.766 1.03% 
Upper middle income countries (N=17) (∆ ln ��� − ∆ ln���) 2.51% 0.50% 
 ln(��� /���) 7.69% 0.27% 
 ∆��� 0.058 0.84% 
 ���  0.687 0.92% 
 
Although the models estimated and presented here were developed with the 
intention to roughly resemble the earlier landmark studies on the demographic dividend, 
there are a few noteworthy differences that should be kept in mind when comparing the 
results:  
a) Our model considers convergence in terms of output per worker, not output per 
person of working age as is the case in most of the other studies. Since we were 
able to get access to new data on labor force participation this seemed the more 
appropriate specification in the spirit of the underlying economic growth model. 
b) As a consequence of the availability of these labor force data we explicitly 
included the labor force participation rate as a variable in the model. To our 
knowledge this has not been done by earlier studies. This has also implications 
for what is defined to be the “translation” and “productivity” effect. If the model 
is only specified in terms of persons in working age an underlying increase in 
e.g. female labor force participation shows up as an increase in productivity of 
persons in working age. In our model this effect can be directly measured and is 
interpreted as part of the translation effect. 
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c)  Unlike earlier studies by Bloom and colleagues we explicitly include data on 
investment in our models. This was done in order to conform to the current 
practice in economic growth models. 
d) Many of the earlier studies also included life expectancy at birth as an 
explanatory variable in the equations. We also did this initially but since it 
consistently turned out to be insignificant we decided to not include it in the 
table of results presented here. 
e) Unlike many of the earlier studies that did include indicators of the level of 
education in the form of mean years of schooling of the adult population we 
include both the level of the education variable and its change over time. As the 
results presented above show, this makes an important difference with respect to 
the importance of the education variable to economic growth. As described 
above, our analysis also uses a new and more internally consistent set of 
education data as provided by the IIASA-VID reconstructions. 
Keeping these differences in the estimated models and used data in mind, the 
significantly different findings that we gain appear to result primarily from three factors: 
1. The educational attainment data used here is more consistent across countries 
and over time than the Barro and Lee (2001) data. These differences are 
discussed in detail in Lutz et al. (2007), Lutz et al. (2008), and Lutz and KC 
(2011). The higher consistency is essentially a consequence of the demographic 
back projections (including consideration of educational mortality differentials) 
where by definition the education categories stay consistent, unlike in the 
official data reported by countries to UNESCO where categories tend to be 
unstable (Lutz et al. 2007). 
2.  The estimation method used in this study is state of the art. Using dynamic 
panel GMM methods, we are able to avoid biases in the estimation that originate 
from the panel structure of the dataset.1 
3. A key difference seems to lie in the way the education variable is treated. By 
including only the level or the change in educational attainment previous studies 
evidently lost relevant information, which we include by adding both to the 
model in the vein of the endogenous growth literature. 
4 Conclusions and Paths of Further Research  
Using an improved dataset and state of the art panel methods, we showed that the labor 
productivity effects which are claimed to accompany the demographic dividend can be 
explained through the changes in educational attainment level which take place hand in 
hand with fertility declines. The remaining effect of changes in the age structure on 
economic growth does not appear statistically different from the standard translation 
effect due to the changes in dependency ratios during the demographic transition.  
                                                 
1
 This point does not seem to make a decisive difference. Our results are broadly consistent with those in 
Lutz et al (2008), where standard OLS with fixed effects are used. 
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This paper should only be seen as a first step in a broader assessment of the 
effects of changes in population composition according to a larger number of relevant 
individual characteristics on economic growth. Here we only focused on (chronological) 
age, labor force participation and educational attainment. The models were defined in a 
way to be roughly compatible with the most influential previous models in the 
demographic dividend literature. The statistical analysis presented above shows that the 
explicit consideration of both the levels and the changes in educational attainment add 
significant explanatory power and deserve to be a key component of any future study on 
the demographic dividend. Since empirically a declining young-age dependency ratio 
tends to come along with an increasing educational attainment of the adult population, 
simple models that only consider fixed age intervals and disregard education can thus 
falsely attribute the productivity enhancing effect of education to a declining young-age 
dependency ratio and thus the typically preceding fertility decline. 
A further extension of the analysis should utilize the age, sex and distribution 
detail of the newly reconstructed human capital data. Since in most countries the 
younger cohorts are better educated than the older ones, the use of mean years of 
schooling of the entire adult population above a certain age (as is done in most 
economic studies) cannot reflect these inter-cohort differences. Also it could be studied 
to what degree differential expansion rates of the different educational attainment 
categories effect economic growth and how this interacts with the changing age 
structure. 
Finally, human capital is not only based on formal education and labor force 
participation but also on skills, cognitive functioning and health. While these 
dimensions are clearly more difficult to quantify and hardly any time series with 
consistent data exist, more could be done using existing data for subsets of countries 
such as the OECD or EU for which more standardized surveys exist (Hanushek and 
Woessmann 2008). An explicit inclusion of age-specific health and cognition indicators 
could also help to address the above described problems of using longer time series 
based on conventional chronological age. While it is interesting and important for 
setting policy priorities to try to identify the relative contributions of all these different 
demographic/human capital dimensions on economic growth, the demographic dividend 
should be understood as a comprehensive concept that covers improvement in the 
human capital base of societies that will impact positively on the wellbeing of their 
individual members. 
5 References 
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte 
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of 
Economic Studies 58(2): 277–297. doi:10.2307/2297968 
Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental-variable estimation 
of error-components models. Journal of Econometrics 68(1): 29–51. 
Barro, R. J., & Lee, J. W. (1993). International comparison of educational attainment. 
Journal of Monetary Economics 32(3): 363–394. 
Barro, R. J., & Lee, J. W. (2001). International data on educational attainment: Updates 
and implications. Oxford Economic Papers 53(3): 541–563. 
 12 
Benhabib, J., & Spiegel, M. (1994). The role of human capital in economic 
development. Evidence from aggregate cross-country data. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 34(2): 143–173. doi:10.1016/0304-3932(94)90047-7 
Benhabib, J., & Spiegel, M. (2005). Human Capital and Technology Diffusion. 
Handbook of Economic Growth (Vol. 1, pp. 935–966). Elsevier. 
Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., Fink, G., & Finlay, J. E. (2009). Fertility, female labor force 
participation, and the demographic dividend. Journal of Economic Growth 
14(2): 79–101. 
Bloom, D. E., & Williamson, J. G. (1998). Demographic transitions and economic 
miracles in emerging Asia. World Bank Economic Review 12(3): 419–455. 
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1999). GMM estimation with persistent panel data: An 
application to production functions (IFS Working Paper No. W99/04). Institute 
for Fiscal Studies. Retrieved from http://ideas.repec.org/p/ifs/ifsewp/99-04.html 
Bongaarts, J. (2010). The causes of educational differences in fertility in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 8: 31–50. 
doi:10.1553/populationyearbook2010s31 
Cochrane, S. H. (1979). Fertility and Education. What do we really know? Baltimore, 
Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Cochrane, S. H., Khan, M. A., & Osheba, I. K. T. (1990). Education, income, and 
desired fertility in Egypt: A revised perspective. Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 38(2): 313–339. 
Crespo Cuaresma, J., & Mishra, T. (2011). The role of age-structured education data for 
economic growth forecasts. Journal of Forecasting 30(2): 249–267. 
doi:10.1002/for.1171 
Ehrlich, P. R. (1968). The Population Bomb. New York, NY: Ballantine. 
Ehrlich, P. R., & Ehrlich, A. H. (1990). The Population Explosion. New York, NY: 
Simon & Schuster. 
Hall, R. E., & Jones, C. I. (1999). Why do some countries produce so much more output 
per worker than others? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(1): 83–116. 
Hanushek, E. A., & Woessmann, L. (2008). The role of cognitive skills in economic 
development. Journal of Economic Literature 46(3): 607–668. 
Heston, A., Summers, R., & Aten, B. (2009). Penn World Table Version 6.3. University 
of Pennsylvania: Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income 
and Prices. 
KC, S., & Lentzner, H. (2010). The effect of education on adult mortality and disability: 
A global perspective. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 8: 201–235. 
doi:10.1553/populationyearbook2010s201 
Kelley, A., & Schmidt, R. (2005). Evolution of recent economic-demographic 
modeling: A synthesis. Journal of Population Economics 18(2): 275–300. 
Lee, R., Mason, A., & Miller, T. (2000). Life cycle saving and the demographic 
transition: The case of Taiwan. Population and Development Review 
26(Supplement: Population and Economic Change in East Asia): 194–219. 
Lee, R., Mason, A., & Miller, T. (2003). Saving, wealth and the transition from transfers 
to individual responsibility: The cases of Taiwan and the United States. The 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105(3): 339–357. 
Lutz, W., Crespo Cuaresma, J., & Abbasi-Shavazi, M. J. (2010). Demography, 
education, and democracy: Global trends and the case of Iran. Population and 
Development Review 36(2): 253–281. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2010.00329.x 
 13 
Lutz, W., Crespo Cuaresma, J., & Sanderson, W. C. (2008). The demography of 
educational attainment and economic growth. Science 319(5866): 1047–1048. 
doi:10.1126/science.1151753 
Lutz, W., Goujon, A., KC, S., & Sanderson, W. C. (2007). Reconstruction of 
populations by age, sex and level of educational attainment for 120 countries for 
1970-2000. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 2007, pp. 193–235. 
Vienna, Austria: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. 
Lutz, W., & KC, S. (2011). Global human capital: Integrating education and population. 
Science 333(6042): 587–592. doi:10.1126/science.1206964 
National Research Council. (1986). Population Growth and Economic Development: 
Policy Questions. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
Nelson, R. R., & Phelps, E. S. (1966). Investment in humans, technological diffusion, 
and economic growth. The American Economic Review 56(1/2): 69–75. 
Pamuk, E. R., Fuchs, R., & Lutz, W. (2011). Comparing relative effects of education 
and economic resources on infant mortality in developing countries. Population 
and Development Review 37(4): 637–664. doi:10.1111/j.1728-
4457.2011.00451.x 
Simon, J. L. (1982). Ehrlich, Paul saying it is so doesn’t make it so. Social Science 
Quarterly 63(2): 381–385. 
Simon, J. L. (1981). The Ultimate Resource. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Skirbekk, V., & KC, S. (2012). Fertility-reducing dynamics of women’s social status 
and educational attainment. Asian Population Studies, article in press. 
doi:10.1080/17441730.2012.714667 
UNFPA. (2011). Impact of Demographic Change in Thailand. Bangkok, Thailand: 
United Nations Population Fund.  
 
  
 14 
Appendix: Data and Variables 
Table A1 presents the list of countries included in the analysis. All countries for which 
data are available are used, with the exception of oil exporters. Income per capita data 
are sourced from the Penn World Tables 6.3 (PWT 6.3, Heston et al. 2009). Capital 
stock data are obtained using the perpetual inventory method based on investment rates 
from the PWT 6.3. Labor force, working age population and total population are 
obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The educational 
attainment variable is the mean years of schooling for persons aged 15-64, sourced from 
the IIASA-VID dataset. 
 
Table A1: Countries in the sample 
Angola Congo, Rep. Guatemala Mongolia Senegal 
Argentina Colombia Honduras Mozambique Singapore 
Australia Comoros Haiti Mauritania Sierra Leone 
Austria Cape Verde Hungary Mauritius El Salvador 
Burundi Costa Rica Indonesia Malawi Somalia 
Belgium Cuba India Malaysia Sao Tome and Principe 
Benin Djibouti Ireland Niger Sweden 
Burkina Faso Denmark Italy Nigeria Syria 
Bangladesh Dominican Republic Jordan Nicaragua Chad 
Bulgaria Algeria Japan Netherlands Togo 
Bahamas Ecuador Kenya Norway Thailand 
Belize Egypt Cambodia Nepal Tunisia 
Bolivia Spain Korea New Zealand Turkey 
Brazil Ethiopia Lao PDR Pakistan Tanzania 
Cent. Af. Rep. Finland Liberia Panama Uganda 
Canada France Sri Lanka Peru Uruguay 
Switzerland United Kingdom Morocco Philippines United States 
Chile Ghana Madagascar Poland Vietnam 
China Guinea-Bissau Maldives Portugal South Africa 
Cote d'Ivoire Equatorial Guinea Mexico Paraguay Zambia 
Cameroon Greece Mali Rwanda Zimbabwe 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
